… the new science has moved us from chance to choice in many matters … With choice comes the responsibility to use that choice ethically. Doing so requires two kinds of courage: the courage to go forward with the new science and technology when it is morally and ethically acceptable to do so, and the courage to exercise restraint when it is morally and ethically required. It is at this point that an interest in the health of the public and an interest in the health of the individual may conflict, with this tension exacerbated by the interest in advancing medicine which may benefit all or any one of us.
The concept of risk is central to our analysis given that the consequences of xenotransplantation are events of the future; it is a biotechnology that threatens and promises potential future harm as well as possible benefit. There is much critical literature on risk, the logic of risk and the repercussions of a focus on risk in contemporary society. 13 A widespread fear of risk has arguably made it easier to rely on knowledge of the possible risks a phenomenon poses to justify preventative (legal) action to forestall harm.
14 Yet when it comes to the question of whether to utilise a biotechnology that may have a significant impact on individuals and society, risks of harm cannot and should not be ignored. We do not pretend that the risks posed by xenotransplantation are certain, but the nature of the harm to public health that this biotechnology could unleash is severe. We argue that it is sometimes legally and ethically necessary for the state to act to protect the health of the public, and that xenotransplantation is a case in point. Some have suggested that because of the risk of possible harm, the public should be consulted about using xenotransplantation and/or that the non-human animals, the xeno-recipients and, possibly, others should be subject to surveillance and monitoring schemes pre-and post-xenotransplant. However, we go further. 15 Because of the limited evidence that xenotransplants will be a viable solution to the organ shortage problem (benefit), and the extreme risks of harm that accompany this 13 See for example, A Giddens, Consequences of Modernity (1990) biotechnology, it should not proceed to clinical trials. Our conclusion is supported by our modification of the precautionary principle with Mill's harm principle to aid us in determining how the tension in the different notions of public health can be addressed.
Our paper is split into seven sections. We first set out the risks of xenotransplantation, results of pre-clinical and clinical trials, and how it is regulated in the UK. We then outline the model of risk we have adopted, before discussing how interests in the health of the public and in public health are called into play by this developing biotechnology. In the final three sections we explore and then apply our two key principles (precautionary and harm) to the risks of xenotransplantation.
II. XENOTRANSPLANTATION
In the UK, xenotransplantation is defined as:
… any procedure that involves the transplantation, implantation, or infusion into a human recipient of either live tissues or organs retrieved from animals, or, human body fluids, cells, tissues or organs that have undergone ex vivo contact with live nonhuman animal cells, tissues or organs. 16 This biotechnology has been developed because of the shortfall in the number of human organs available for transplantation worldwide. It is hoped that if a xenotransplant proves 53 But there has been no report of a solid organ non-human animal to human xenotransplant since 1993 54 and, crucially, a genetically engineered pig solid organ is yet to be xenotransplanted into a human.
As the barriers to xenotransplantation have yet to be pre-clinically addressed, there is limited evidence that genetically engineered pigs will be a source of viable organs. It is not known whether such an organ will be able to support the life of a human, neither is it clear what risks the xeno-recipient and others may be exposed to. Despite these uncertainties, researchers continue to work towards clinical trials, with some suggesting these are 'imminent'. 55 It is thus essential to consider the more theoretical question of whether to allow trials which may benefit a few but jeopardise the health of many more and, first, the practical question of how, if permitted, such trials are regulated. knowing the probability of a known possible outcome makes it a more concrete risk, uncertainty will remain in terms of whether it will actually occur and all of its consequences.
C. The Regulation of Xenotransplantation in the UK
Moreover, simply because there is a higher level of uncertainty about the probability of a possible outcome occurring, this does not move it from a risk to an uncertainty because so long as it may occur, it remains a risk. A risk must involve an element of uncertainty in order for it to be a risk. 66 Definitionally, it does not matter that some risks are more certain than others. Thus, the fact that the potential negative outcomes of xenotransplantation are uncertain does not preclude describing these possible outcomes as risks.
The language of risk is, however, problematic as risk can refer to (i) the negative outcome itself, (ii) the probability of a certain negative outcome, (iii) adopting a hazardous course of action, or (iv) endangering something. to Gostin, measures taken to protect public health should be based on significant risks not just 'speculative, theoretical, or remote' ones, and in order to assess the level of a risk, account should be taken of the nature and duration of it, the probability of the harm occurring, and the severity of it.
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Although we cannot measure or quantify the risks involved in clinical xenotransplantation, it is surely more dangerous to proceed in the face of the possible risks of it than not to because: 
IV. INTEREST IN THE HEALTH OF INDIVIDUALS AND XENOTRANSPLANTATION

A. General
It is indisputable that the state has an interest in the health of the individuals which comprise it and this can mean establishing health care systems which provide appropriate care to those in need in a timely manner. These key aims of the UK's National Health Service, 78 
B. Applied to xenotransplantation
Interest in public health requires the state to take measures to remove causes of ill health and prevent epidemic diseases and it could demand a precautionary, evidence-based approach to xenotransplantation. In fulfilling its obligations and responsibility to the public, the UK state might have a duty to ban xenotransplantation because of the significant risk of harm to health it poses. Failure to prohibit xenotransplantation arguably means the state would knowingly be permitting the public's exposure to serious risks which cannot currently be quantified and thus controlled or appropriately managed. Conversely, the public interest in health could require the state to encourage xenotransplantation to save or prolong individual lives, as less suffering and ill health is beneficial to the wider community and the health of us all, and if xenotransplantation is successful the shortage of organs could be resolved, making resources available for other treatments. Yet just because there are possible gains for public health and individual interests, this does not mean that it should be automatically assumed that xenotransplantation will and should proceed to clinical trial. A parallel can be drawn with reproductive cloning. As another new science, public health may have benefited from the introduction of an additional method of combating infertility, and the individual interest in having a biologically related child would have been served by its clinical application. Notwithstanding this, reproductive cloning remains unlawful in the UK. 107 The prohibition is undoubtedly in part because reproductive cloning is a symbolic wrong that seems to violate the value of respect for human life and dignity, 108 but a further justification is the potential harm to the clone due to birth defects.
This means that in situations where there are recognised harms to human health but the extent of those harms is not known, as with most clinical trials, then the person proposing the trial has the burden of proof with regards to risks, and immediate action is required in order to forestall potentially serious consequences to health in the future. 126 Andorno comments:
in view of the possibility of serious harmful effects … it is not acceptable just to say:
'we cannot be sure that serious damage will happen, so we will do nothing to prevent it.' If there are good reasons, based on empirical evidence or plausible causal hypothesis, to believe that damage might occur, and given the crucial importance of what is at stake (the life and health of people …), adequate measure should be taken as soon as possible to prevent such disastrous outcomes.
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In this way, the precautionary principle expands the harm principle so that it encompasses public goods and possible harm to future generations. 128 Mill's harm principle thus supports our argument that in some situations (xenotransplantation being one) a precautionary approach influenced by the harm principle, should prevail. suggested that it may be difficult to definitely ascertain that conduct poses no significant risk of future harm, 141 and that it may be so easy now to formulate arguments predicated upon harm that the harm principle has collapsed in on itself. 142 We disagree, but accept that caution must be taken when addressing harm claims in order to ensure that the harm principle remains sufficiently defined and restrictive. It is important to note that although often viewed through the lens of individual autonomy, there is no reason why Mill's harm theory cannot operate in the context of public health. 143 To recap, we use risk to refer to the possible negative outcomes of xenotransplantation and the probability of these outcomes occurring. On the basis of the available evidence, moving to clinical trials presents uncertain risks of a grave nature, the main one being an infectious disease pandemic. Xenotransplantation poses manufactured risks, risks created by scientific progress and of which we have no prior experience; thus calculating the probability of their occurrence is especially difficult. Applying lesser harms logic, the risks posed by xenotransplantation should be lower than the risks of organ failure that it is designed to treat.
Although an individual in need of a xenotransplant may die without one, the fact that xenotransplantation poses risks to others besides the recipient must be taken into account when weighing up the seriousness of risk. Finally, even if it were possible to ascertain that the probability of the risk of an infectious disease pandemic is very low, because of the serious nature of this risk, this does not make the risk acceptable.
Therefore, as xenotransplantation poses real risks of harm, and liberal and more collective concerns are relevant, we propose that the precautionary principle informed by the harm principle should be used as a guide to ascertain whether public health should be prioritised over an individual's health, even in a life prolonging situation. We have set out the key components of the precautionary principle -acting in advance of scientifically certain and established risks, anticipating risks and minimising them but not necessarily eradicating Although researchers and potential xeno-recipients only intend to preserve life and not harm others, they are arguably reckless given the risk of harm that providing and accepting a xenotransplant creates, and should be brought to account for this. 152 Researchers' have a responsibility to others besides the potential xeno-recipient, 153 and 'it could be argued that the numerous studies showing the possibility of widespread viral outbreaks prove such injury was reasonably foreseeable to the companies, medical centers and individuals performing xenotransplantation.' 154 We could add research ethics committees to this list as such a committee would be involved in the decision as to whether a xenotransplant clinical trial was performed in the UK. 155 An exception on the basis of harm being caused for a legitimate reason, such as self defence, can be recognised under the harm principle; 156 but the preservation of the xenotransplant recipient's life cannot be a legitimate reason to run the risk of causing harm to countless others. Ensuring the health of the greatest number must outweigh the potential benefit of saving one individual life. Given the current pre-clinical evidence on xenotransplantation, an assessment of the possible benefits to the recipient and public health and the risk to public health, must lean towards prohibiting xenotransplantation. Reassurance that such a risk does not exist is not provided by the current scientific evidence. Moreover, once xenotransplantation clinically proceeds it is impossible to guarantee that public health is not at risk and the danger of disease transfer and a pandemic moves from theoretical to real. And if they actualise it will be too late.
The public interest in health thus offers a powerful reason for state interference to prohibit xenotransplantation. Combining the precautionary principle with the harm principle means that if the actions of medical researchers harm or, crucially, might harm others, then it is legitimate for the State to intervene. This does not mean that prohibition is the only option;
rather, the level of the intervention is context specific; regulation and moratoriums are amongst the possibilities. But for xenotransplantation we argue that prohibition is currently most appropriate. Mill argued that there will be cases where state intervention is not justified, despite the fact that an individual's actions have caused harm. 157 Current available evidence suggests xenotransplantation poses potential for serious harm to public health, so the harm principle should be applied more forcefully to prevent clinical trials proceeding. In the context of xenotransplantation the harm principle thus becomes a liberty limiting rather than liberty enhancing principle. A biotechnology like xenotransplantation requires that the precedence given to an individual interest in health in some societies is challenged, and individual interests take second place to a more communitarian, public health approach.
IX. CONCLUSION
Xenotransplantation will pose an infection risk to the individual recipient and may unleash unknown and unidentifiable diseases into the population, but an accurate assessment of this risk cannot occur until genetically engineered pig solid organs are xenotransplanted into humans and even then due to the latency of some diseases, such an assessment may be delayed for many years and hampered by the diagnostic tools currently available. But society has to decide in advance whether the benefit some individuals may obtain from a xenotransplant outweighs the burdens the wider public will have to bear. Making such a decision will not be easy, not only because of this lack of information but also because of difficulties in interpreting the information which does exist. For example, statements that there is no evidence of PERV infection may mean there is no evidence of this so far, but can be interpreted as meaning there is no risk of PERV infection at all.
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Given the impossibility of measuring the risks of xenotransplantation and the "histories of lentiviruses and prions have taught us about the untameable distances between the laboratory, the spread of infectious diseases and public health", 159 a better approach would be to avoid taking the risk to ensure that needless harm is not created. 160 This may seem unnecessarily precautionary but as there are alternatives to xenotransplantation including reforming existing allotransplant recovery systems and structures and the promise of stem cells, 161 there is no need to create this risk in the first place. In the light of the limited pre-clinical survival times, uncertainty as to the ability of genetically engineered pig organs to support human life, the potentially catastrophic risks, and the difficulties in identifying, managing and controlling those risks, it is unclear why some still view xenotransplantation as a viable solution to the shortage of organs. 162 In this environment, the public interest in health and state obligations to protect public health require the state to prohibit clinical xenotransplantation. 
